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2. Even though the NSC has not formally approved a new NSC then there have been significant changes in national level strategic thinking. These changes primarily deal with increased emphasis on our non-nuclear posture and on flexible and selective responses, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to the entire spectrum of the Communist Threat.

3. Purpose of JSCP is to:

a. Translate national objectives and policies of the US into terms of military objectives, strategic concepts, & tasks which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities

b. Constitute a directive to CINCs for the conduct of ops in cold, hot & GW.

c. Provide strategic & logistic planning guidance.

See Annex C, J (JSCP) (C/F), and

6: Modern Warfare Strategy Considerations, CP,
Recovery & Reconstitution

Military Obj. 8

8. Overall military objective of the US is to provide
for the judicious use of military strength as an
element of national power to achieve US objectives,
avoiding hostilities as long as such avoidance is
compatible with US interests, but being prepared
to conduct any war in a manner designed to
further the interests of the US and its Allies and to
defeat the enemy.

GW

9. The military objective of the US for general war is
to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc

[GW defined as armed conflict between the major
powers of the communist & free world in all-out
war with China, must defeat Soviet Bloc? Vies,
where? The latter means GW?]

This includes: (old ENSC)

3. Destroying or neutralizing the military capabilities of the enemy, with the retention, ready, effective and controlled US strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military superiority over the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.
- b. Minimizing damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events limiting such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.
- c. Bringing the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the US and its Allies.
- d. Defending the US and the vital areas.
- e. Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.

10. CW obj:

2. To deal quickly & effectively with any CW in a manner & on a scale best calculated to bring the war to a conclusion on terms advantageous to the US and to minimize the risk of hostilities breaking into GW.

6. & peacefully and rapidly as is compatible with US interests, to conduct war in a manner which:

- 1) Protects the interests of friendly peoples involved.
- 2) Enhances Allied solidarity and effectiveness.
- 3) Provides for effective & max. utilization of indigenous forces.
- 4) Discourages future aggressors from resorting to armed force.
- 5) Controls the scope and intensity of the conflict to minimize the risk of escalation to GW.
- 6) Concludes the war on terms advantageous to the US.

172. SIOP is contains three tasks which may be
implemented in one of a number of attack options.
It is recognized that nuclear capable ^{offensive} forces
not committed to SIOP may be employed
concurrently with nuclear

F

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c. Potential of C-B weapons must be exploited to the maximum possible. This objective includes use of C-B weapons whenever tactically appropriate without regarding them as any special form of warfare. The uninhibited use of disabling but non-lethal agents may provide the critical breakthrough.

d. The qualitative capabilities of man — particularly in regard to his determination to succeed, to his ability to exercise judgment, to discriminate, to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, to cope with unanticipated developments — strongly indicate that a military system with man aboard will have a significantly higher flexibility [survivability, operational effectiveness] and will be much more responsive to the requirements of the military missions involved.

GW: Military objective of the US for general war, a war with the USSR, [not in JSDP: disagreement over role of China in 1965], is to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

This includes:

a) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Comm. China to the point where they have lost their will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like RAND: to wage war]

b) Defending the US and other vital areas.

c) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.

d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.

e) Concluding ~~objectives~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US & Allied post-war objectives.

[NOTE: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GW as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & surrender of SU. — though this is not what AF had in mind.]

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities.

will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like BRSP: to wage war]

- a) Defending the US and other vital areas.
- c) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.
- d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.
- e) Concluding ~~objection~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US + Allied post-war objectives.

[NOTE: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GNV as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & surrender of SC — though this is not what AP had in mind].

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities and against other targets that constitute an immediate threat to friendly forces in that area. Situations may occur in which authorization for the use of nuclear weapons will be delayed. There will be other contingencies which do not warrant the use

[arg?]

The US, under conditions of general war, will launch [not "probably"] in initial nuclear strategic attack against optimum-risk target system (the VSTC), as an essential action to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

[Tasks now included in NSOP also]

M- M+G expansion: during limited war or prior to a GW.

a) Plans will stipulate that nuclear weapons will be used as [when?] authorized by the Pres.

b) CW plans should include appropriate provision for partial implementation [No nuclear?] in the event such action becomes necessary.

c) War plans will be executed when directed by the JCS. [Pres?]
Implementing messages will specifically designate those nations against which operations are to be conducted.

of military objectives, strategic concepts and tasks which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commanders of the unified & spec. commands for the conduct of ops in total, limited and general war.
[Abandon this triadology]

Provides strategies & objectives, planning guidance...

In military services for disposition, employment & support of US military forces in the conduct of ops, under

[Since OP related to actual current capabilities, curious that OP is identical to for 1965.]

[How will do actual capabilities permit U.S. to achieve objectives. Hence, how important to change capabilities: e.g. C & C caps?]

→ Def of S-S Bloc (includes "such other countries as may be determined to be dominated by International Communism.")

[i.e. who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or OP]

GW: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war"

10
policies of the US and USSR

Translate national

USCP

of military objectives, strategic concepts and tasks which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commanders of the unified & spec. commands for the conduct of ops in cold, limited and general war.
[Abandon this trichotomy]

Provide strategic & logistic planning guidance

To military services for disposition, employment & support of US military forces in the conduct of ops, and

[Since CP related to actual current capabilities, curious that OP is identical: for 1965.

[How will do actual capabilities permit US to achieve objectives? Hence, how important to change capabilities: e.g. C & C caps?]

→ Def. of S-S Bloc (includes "such other countries as may be determined to be dominated by International Communism.")

[i.e. Who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or OP]

CHV: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war"

Planning will take into account:

13. Plan over-99 military effectiveness will be

enhanced by making it clear in all actions that our nuclear power is available for use at any time and that we have the will to use this power as required.

14. GW ops will be conducted on a scale and in a manner which indicates that the US has the will to accept the

consequences of general war. [See Annex C]. Operations will be conducted in such a manner as to afford us the maximum opportunity to take the initiative in using our power, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

15. US operations against the USSR may be conducted at a scale less than GW in order to:

1) Achieve those US objectives attainable short of GW.

2) Cause the enemy to reconsider his course of action.

3) Afford us an opportunity for the enemy to conduct military operations.

4) Establish the basis for political negotiations.

5) Place the US in a better position to implement GW plans.

2. Initial Nuclear Ops

2. ^{General} The US, under conditions of general war, will
launch a nuclear strategic attack in accordance
with the SIOP against designated elements of
FSR's strength.

[When? SIOP: 5th count of GW probably
will be characterized by the delivery of intensive
nuclear blows by both sides.] [SIOP: During
initial phase]

d. Flexibility The SIOP will be available at that
version under all reasonably foreseeable conditions.

Notes - initial operation will be in accordance with
provisions for selective responses to the extent

feasible with due consideration to the degree of

U.S. and reliability of the committed forces.

12.6 (2) The Western Alliance now have an over-all military superiority against which all courses of action must ultimately be weighed. This strength is the source of our greater latitude of action in the complete spectrum of war on a world-wide basis even though we do not match the S-S Bloc in all respects. Recognizing that success in warfare is so much a function of such intangible factors as will, psychological considerations and the like, the decision making process must not be unduly influenced by mere statistical ^{taken} evaluation.

6 (1) (above). The

1. initiate a nuclear attack against the homeland
of the other nation or one of its major allies.

2. (a) plans should envisage both mass and precise nuclear weapons. (b) partial implementation, with the support of conventional forces, or due to imminent breakdown of planned reinforcements.

3. It is recognized that, during the period of the plan, engagements between forces of the US and the USSR may occur which, in themselves, are not of such nature as to constitute sufficient causes for the US to implement GW plan. The circumstances, location and kind of events under which an engagement occurs would be major factors in determining what our national response would be. It is not feasible to determine in advance the precise parameters of possible engagements under which the US would.

- 1) Limit, at least temporarily, military operations and thereby
- 2) Engage the Soviet Union in tactical actions locally, preventing
them with alternatives of disengagement with minimal

5.1 " at 1.5

32. CW Nuclear Weapons Policy: The decision to use nuclear weapons will be made by the President and will

reflect the intent of the NSC-68. (1) Make every possible effort to keep the war at a non-nuclear level, but be prepared to use nuclear weapons when necessary. (2) Meet nuclear aggression

3. The NSC-68, at the time nuclear weapons are authorized for use by the President, provides additional guidance, as required.

38b. - Nuclear weapons will be employed:

- 1) If they are used against US and Allied forces.
- 2) If their use is necessary to maintain the tactical integrity of the forces engaged, or
- 3) If a deliberate political decision is made to demonstrate, by discriminate use, our will and ability to employ nuclear weapons, if necessary.

(See Contingency of Rules of Engagement)

with appropriate nuclear response. (1) That

non-nuclear attacks will receive response when

critical US interests cannot be defended at the

non-nuclear level

40 C2C

a. In order to ensure that military force is applied effectively, national authority will be delegated to the commander(s) concerned for the carrying out of ops.

b. Unified and specified commanders will coordinate operations; the JCS will provide strategic guidance and ensure the timely augmentation and support of forces engaged.

c. Employment of nuclear weapons in GW will be subject to a greater degree of control than would be the case in GW.

GW Posture

16c. Survivable Command, Communication & Information reporting system to permit controlled, coordinated and informed direction of US forces & combined ops.

15. GW Planning

" 2. GW might result from miscalculation or
[?]
hostilities about GW which were not
initially intended by either side to lead to GW or,
less likely, it might be initiated by the USSR with
a nuclear onslaught, with little or no warning.
[Continue USSR:]

However, it is estimated that they will not deliberately
launch a general war, at least so long as they are
convinced that the US and its allies are prepared to
respond with sufficient strength to inflict a degree
of damage unacceptable to the USSR. In response to
knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US
or to honor a treaty commitment, the US forces may
be required to take the initiative. [see USSR, Para]

There is even under conditions of nuclear exchange involving
the homelands of the US and the USSR, planning and weapons
that the use of nuclear weapons in certain limited cases
may not be authorized. [not politically feasible?]

1.

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5-1

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62

—

to be dominated by International Communism!

[Cuba?] [2700 included?]

Soviet Bloc

Soviet USSR

12.5 (2) The US and its allies now
(not in USOP)

14 = Transition from Non-nuclear to Nuclear Operations

Concludes after world is in state

commensurate with the situation. Such ops will
indicate an intention and provide the option

to engage the enemy non-nuclear forces on a
scale of our own choosing [?] before having
to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons

i. However, if the enemy does not suspend
military operations and if a significant US

force is directly engaged and the tactical
interests of the US are jeopardized the

President would be authorized to make the
necessary decision to

1) Employ nuclear weapons; no

2) Initiate General War if required.

The decision cannot be made in advance, nor can a valid judgment be made in advance, as to which [of above?] course of action would be in our interests. However, US plans will be designed to meet non-nuclear attacks with nuclear response unless vital US interests cannot be defended at the non-nuclear level.

15c. Planning will take into account ~~both~~ the capabilities of both US and Other powers. In the regard it is recognized that the selection of an Attack Option could be influenced considerably by the actions taken (or contemplated) by our nuclear capable allies.

16. GW Posture

The GW posture encompasses all US military forces and will include:

2. Responsive, survivable and flexible nuclear offensive forces which:

1) In the short term, [?] are capable of emerging from a nuclear exchange with a clear military advantage [?]

2) In the longer term, will possess the highest practicable degree of alert and be capable of a range of options; including those made possible by a secure command [note in ISOP] to increase control of response and enhance military flexibility

[ISOP: no short term - longer term conditions]

Under the terms of the...

See OS2-DCM...

Estimated US...

War Potential of the US

2/1/68. The availability of US manpower for military and civil service would be substantially reduced by the requirements for emergency civil defense recovery operations.

An estimated 10-20 million persons may be required to perform emergency rehabilitation work. However, such requirements would not necessarily miss military operations and those involved. It is possible that

as many as 42,000,000 persons may be killed and 12,000,000 injured. If so, restrictions would be imposed on the peak strength of the Armed Forces and military and physical standards for accessions into the

Armed force would probably be reduced. Stringent manpower controls & restrictions of the civilian economy & the minimum essential activities would be imposed. The time

phasing of US deployment would be delayed.

Policy plan of CINCUS, including VO-63, will ensure

that all aspects of current flexibility and
adaptability are clearly & specifically identified
in plans and provided for in preplanned execution

orders and messages.

GN Oks

24. The will consist of a combination of nuclear & non-nuclear
action with the central emphasis on employment of
nuclear weapons to accomplish the stated objectives.

The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons
is that the US must emerge from initial nuclear
war with a clear military advantage. This advantage
may well include the planned survival in certain
areas of the E-S. P. [?] of known discontent peoples who
can disrupt, on a continuing basis, the enemy war areas.

Offensive ops created by initial nuclear operations will be
exploited. Offensive operations to exploit the strategic
advantage gained by the nuclear ops and to bring the war to
a successful conclusion for the US.

182	2	11
2161	5161	3230

12. Controlled Flexibility of response

6. Plans are listed ^[2] currently available courses of action, the implementation of which will provide a greater degree of control. It is recognized that these possible courses of action could be significantly affected by the precision and completeness of our information on enemy strengths. Accordingly, commanders will include in their plans a concise statement of the risks inherent in their implementation. These courses of action, designed to minimize destruction not directly associated with a specific attack include:

- 1) Withholding all attacks on certain countries.
- 2) Attacking a restricted category of targets in certain countries, e.g. neutralization of air defenses.
- 3) Limitation of delivery systems used on targets in attacked areas, e.g. manned aircraft against targets requiring precise delivery or missiles on targets requiring less precision.

EUR.

Propose plan to assist any revolutionary outbreak that may occur in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania.

Planning should be made for the following military actions:

1) Logistics support.

2) Deployment of Special Forces to assist revolutionary forces.

3) Payroll ops.

4) Direct military intervention by US military forces take into account two situations: a) when US forces are not currently engaged, at which time an

assignment of Albanian planning action to encourage them regarding the intervention in Poland.

17. Plans for employment of non-SIOP forces, to the extent possible, will be based upon the same degree of autonomous initiative as is applicable to SIOP forces, but related to the attack options of the SIOP, ^{will} be complementary to SIOP missions.

Ops by CMCs may take the form of defensive [?] ops for an extensive period of time, followed by offensive ops, or early offensive ops in the event of a pre-emptive attack. Therefore, for GW planning purposes, ops could fall into one of two broad categories: i.e. defensive ops in the event of initiation of GW under conditions of tactical warning only [I, II, III, IV, V] or offensive ops at an early time in the event of pre-emptive strikes in accordance with attack options

I + II

SCP

30. It is recognized that present, in hand, across the board, capabilities are required to support sustained major non-nuclear operations.

Continuing efforts will be placed on enhancing logistic capabilities to conduct sustained nonnuclear operations.

LOW Ops

36. Should LOW involving the US occur, the US will:

- 1) React swiftly & effectively to repel the aggression.
- 2) Be prepared to shift or expand the area of conflict in such a way so that US & Allied strengths can be more effectively ^{applied} employed. [?]
- 3) Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples & territories previously lost through aggression. [?]
- 4) Fight in concert with others, & eventually, if needed.
- 5) Limit damage within the area of conflict, consistent with the achievement of military objectives.

c. Recognizing that substantial elements of forces committed to the initial attacks will survive and be available for subsequent strike and as such can be considered as an integral element of the regional reserve.

SICP: provide for optimum integration of committed forces of the CINCS and for coordination with other external commands, for all planned attacks on selected targets. DGZ's + weight of effort.

5C. Any conflicts which arise in force programming of SIOP forces for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option IV. T-01

VIS responsibility: Prepare annual guidelines for S/Os

Revised - 1972

Task IV: Short or execution of controlled, deliberate attacks.

11. Nuclear Reserve. The retention of, or the capability to reconstitute quickly, a reserve is an indispensable requirement for all types of warfare and is particularly significant in general war. [1]

With current capabilities, the requirement for a nuclear reserve can be fulfilled to a degree by:

a. Nuclear capable forces not permanently committed to initial strikes: e.g. those aircraft carriers, SAC command support [2] and training unit aircraft and the forces not committed to the drop or initial committed war plan.

b. Continued improvements in planning for use of surviving forces in follow-on and "on-call" roles against targets, as required.

o. To assist in developing a climate of
opinion abroad which will permit the US
to operate its military forces where and when
required.

9. C-E systems must be provided which will ensure continuity of operations and facilitate succession of command for those command elements and communication facilities that are estimated to be primary targets in a limited or general war.

[CP's?]

resonance operation techniques [?]

15. Plans must provide for survivable emergency comm system which will provide minimum essential elements for C & C.

CW

14. Maximum advantage will be taken of new techniques affording survivability of communications through hardening, mobility, concealment, dispersal, alternate routing and multiple means to ensure maintenance of capability to control the military

power of the U

responsibility to US 20

political and military obligations [?]

I Mil. C-E objectives

4. c To develop & maintain C & C, and command systems which are continuously operational (endless)

C-E system, reliable, secure, and reasonably survivable

Guiding Principles

~~1.~~ Systems & facilities must be responsive to the C-E requirements of originating in the chain of military command [national] that are associated with the rapid, selective, flexible, and enduring control of military forces.

6. C-E design, planning, engineering & construction efforts will be based on a full consideration of possible political, military and national influences of a destructive or disruptive nature and possible even exploitation of electromagnetic radiation of friendly forces.

friendly forces.

29

[INFO; SENSORS; BOMB-ALARM; COMM WITH ENEMY]

(iv) Authorize every air or naval base directly supporting bases engaged, on a selective basis.

When nuclear weapons are authorized for use by the President, it may be necessary for the JCS to provide additional guidance to cover the particular situation.

Annex C:

limited to forces engaged [supporting?] in the conflict.

will

c) If a deliberate political decision is made to demonstrate, by discriminate use, one's ability to employ nuclear weapons. Specific guidance will be provided at the time the decision is made to demonstrate. For planning purposes,

2) Provide for retrograde use in order to minimize risk of pre-emptive attack by:

- i) Confining strikes to purely military targets or targets of military significance.
- ii) Selecting targets for attack which are capable of being destroyed by discriminate employment of relatively low yield nuclear weapons.
- iii) Minimizing civilian losses.

(b) Examples of types targets to be attacked include:

- i) Ground forces directly engaged.
- ii) Airborne enemy aircraft.
- iii) Enemy naval forces at sea.

will

If there is a necessity to maintain the
tactical integrity of the forces engaged, etc.

(See 142-552)

general guidelines, such as nuclear weapons utilization,
are:

a) Nuclear weapons engaged in military power.

b) Nuclear weapons ^{military} power directly supporting engaged forces. [?]

c) (See 142-552) ^[?] as to various S-S applications

that the US is willing to expend hostilities to
achieve necessary.

d) For accomplishing the foregoing:

i) Confine nuclear strikes to military targets
outside the USSR if practicable, and if consistent
with (a) & (b) above.

ii) Hold civilian casualties and damage to a
minimum consistent with military necessity.

iii) Minimize damage of a pre-emption strike on
the USSR and available propaganda measures and

also by insuring that attacks made on enemy
nuclear delivery system

(1) These weapons will be employed [invention
of request in Annex C]

(2) if they are used against US & Allied forces

a) as a minimum, retaliation in kind

b) as a response depending on the situation at
the time, initiate nuclear attacks with all available
force short of execution of LS/OP. [?]

c) Retain the options of (3) & (4),

i) Confine to military targets

ii) Attack delivery systems at points of launch -
allow no sanctuaries

iii) Expand nuclear war to targets in other
areas and medium

(4) React quickly and deliberately decisively but on
a controlled basis so as to indicate clearly
that the US is willing to expand hostilities to
general war, if necessary

1) Take cognizance of Allied policies but do not
allow Allied views to impede required US
unilateral action

The nature of subsequent nuclear ops in G41 cannot
be predicted with great accuracy.

These ops will be decentralized in planning & execution
and will be -

c) Maintain the neutralization, if previously
disrupted, of the primary war-making capability of
the S-S bloc.

?
Option
The chances of having the attack plan announced [?]
and it is, therefore, to be programmed as a
last priority [?] [primary]

military assistance to allies

^{remains} development of NATO, with Allied mid-range plans

b. Translate national objectives & policies into military objectives, provide concepts for the employment of forces and define basic undertakings which implement these mil. obj.

Strat. Appraisal:

Any US or Allied interests in critical situations will progressively intensify Soviet tactics aimed at achieving advantage, including their inclination to employ force or threats of force.

c. The Comm will continue to attempt to employ threats, promises lightly given and more lightly broken, and alternating belligerence and

Treatability

diplomatic leverage and the rule of law.

erosion of normal

international relations which they began following WWII.

Ex: The Bloc seeks to:

1) confirm the division of Europe;

2)

want to: convince the world that they are determined to pursue their objectives in the face of high risks.

Fear of militant German nationalism, the increasingly independent attitude of France, British reluctance to support a firm military posture in Europe, and general reluctance to a degree by most NATO nations (with exception of Greece, Turkey, and FRG) to accept higher level of efforts needed to meet NATO military goals may create new problems in NATO.

The CHICOMS are more likely to engage in overt military action than are the Soviets even with high risk of US intervention.

~ In Europe, military action in NATO areas if successful, would provide a most convincing test of the credibility of the Western Alliance. Despite possible benefits, the risk of escalation or the loss of prestige that would accompany SO withdrawal in the face of an Alliance show of force will probably make this course of action unattractive to the Bloc. On the other hand, action which appears to place the responsibility for initiation of limited hostilities on NATO and whose limits may be kept manageable by political actions, may be used to affront the final partition of Germany, discredit Western action and weaken NATO.

CW objectives (and a subsidiary, when CW = BW)

a. To create conditions under which the US
and may pursue its objectives by peaceful means.

b. To ensure adequate capabilities to engage and
win wars across the entire spectrum using
the range of weapons and forces appropriate
to the situation.

c. To form and support alliances to increase the
strength of the Free World, to cope with the
political threat of World Communism and the
military threat of the S-S Bloc, and to
enhance the resolution of the Free World to
oppose communist objectives.

d. To support the most fundamental aims & objectives
of the UN Charter and other international orgs. of
which the US is a member and whose objectives
it supports.

e. To ensure the credibility of US response in situations
from overseeing to war to make the reality of US

by the Communist Bloc an unavoidable course of action.

be to exploit opportunities to promote division
interests and forces within the S-S Bloc and
target territories where such action may favor
US interests and further US objectives by:

1) Development of satellite territories of effective
disruptive forces under close control for use in
cold, C + G.W. to disrupt enemy communications
and confuse enemy efforts.

[THREATEN?]

2) Aid to underdeveloped and peripheral nations
to organize, train and equip paramilitary forces
to maintain & enhance internal security against
covert & overt, indirect & direct aggression

3) Collateral use of military forces necessary to
reinforce & support overt & covert political,

economic, ~~prog~~

logistical & cultural

progress for the achievement of national objectives

c. Preserving and maintaining as many of its effective Allies as possible.

d. Achieving a residual power relationship with other [?] nations sufficient to

--- survive as a free nation, to pursue US national objectives and to achieve US and allied postwar objectives. [?]

^{under Strategic Concept:-}
[Minimize damage? Intentional deterrence?

Post-attack surviving? Maintenance of control? Preservation of national command?]

to other forces

to reflect the military advantages gained in the initial nuclear offensive, and assist in forcing a conclusion to the war on terms advantageous to the US.

21d. Operations following the initial nuclear offensive will be conducted as prescribed [?] by the JCS to the extent that communication & control structures will permit. However, command must be maintained, in the event

~~Strategic Objectives~~

Mil Obj.

6.2. Basic objectives of the US are to preserve a free & independent US ensuring our own security and enhancing the fundamental values of our institutions; an open world of free nations conducting international affairs under the rule of law; just settlement of international disputes without recourse to force; and economic growth, political stability, and social justice throughout the world.

b. The basic military objectives are to deter aggression, prevent unintended outbreak of war; and, should war occur, conduct the war in a manner and on a scale calculated to achieve US objectives, and to conclude the war on terms advantageous to the US.

CN

f. To deter or frustrate attempts by communist-dominated powers [Cuba?] to extend political, military or ideological influence by threat or use of military forces, or by coups, subversion, infiltration, or guerrilla warfare.

g. To reduce the likelihood of warfare or the expansion of incidents into limited or GW.

h. To exploit opportunities to conduct or support special operations within S-S Bloc territory when appropriate.

i. To discourage independent development of nuclear weapons production facilities by other than selected Allies and to secure US participation in control of any nuclear weapons capabilities by other nations.

j. To assist in civil defense in order to minimize the vulnerability of the US to attack.

h. To develop and maintain C&C systems and communications systems which are continuously operational and immediately responsive to governmental decisions as to initiation, regulation and termination of military operations and which, as a bar to their disruption, avoid excessive concentration of their essential elements

p. To deter the S-S Bloc from initiating GW, or, if the deterrent fails, be prepared to force a conclusion to the war on terms advantageous to the US and its allies.

g. To deter the S-S Bloc from initiating GW or, if the det. fails, be prepared to conduct operations with such weapons and forces as will result in the destruction of the will and capability of the S-S Bloc to conduct further GW operations, and permit termination or regulation on terms advantageous to the US and its allies.

GW

3. In addition to GW obj's; US military obj for GW is to defeat the aggressor in a manner and on a scale best calculated to take full advantage of the US without undesired escalation.

GW.

(Def?)

9. The military obj of the US in GW is to defeat the S-S Bloc. (Def?) This includes:

a. Conducting attacks by US nuclear striking forces which, in conjunction with operations by other forces will result in the destruction of the will and capability of the Soviet Union to conduct further military operations, thereby permitting conclusion of hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its allies.

b. Providing for the defense of the US and other vital areas.

is affected to a degree by the outcome
of initial nuclear offensive/defensive operations.
The US will maintain a capability to accomplish
its SW objectives regardless of conditions under
which initiated. During initial operations,
the US will execute offense & defense operations
to minimize damage to the US and its allies,
to degrade further enemy attack, to retard enemy
forces and their support in order to achieve a
strategic advantage from which to force enemy

x capitulation [Preserve SU leaders? C & C control?
US resource control?] at the earliest possible time.
Offensive operations created in the initial nuclear opera-
tions will be exploited. An attempt is made to

minimize the length of SW

2. Responsive, survivable and flexible nuclear
offensive forces capable of emerging from
initial nuclear operations with a clear
military advantage, possessing the highest degree of
alert, and capable of a range of attack options.

- (i) Prevent escalation, if possible, and prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
- (j) Insofar as is compatible with US interests, conduct CW in a manner which ensures Allied solidarity and effectiveness and discourages future aggressors from resorting to armed force, and which controls the scope and intensity of the conflict as to minimize the risk of escalation to G.W.
- k. Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples and territories previously lost through common military or political aggression.
- l. Wherever practicable, protect the interests of friendly peoples. This may include the planned survival in certain areas of the S-S Bloc of known dissident people who can disrupt, on a continuing basis, the enemy's rear areas.
- (m) Limit damage within the area of conflict consistent with achievement of military objectives.

The US will risk the loss of Allied support, alienation of neutrals, or GW if necessary, in order to defeat S-S aggression.

GW Q.?

US forces may be required and must be prepared to take the initiative if so directed by the President; for example, in response to knowledge that an attack against the US is imminent [initiative?] or to honor treaty commitments. However, US policy precludes the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. [Note SO plan. memo NATO/US Provoked.]

GW if it occurs, might evolve from limited hostilities or be deliberately initiated by the SC with little or no warning and may or may not be preceded by a period of heightened tension. The onset of GW probably will be characterized by the delivery of intensive nuclear blows by both sides. Further

11. I mention a 1st delivery to military bases to insure attainment of policy objectives would

achievements of war and post-war objectives,
and with the requirement to consider the
dictates of military necessity.

Guideline

1.1. c. Make every possible effort to keep the war at
a non-nuclear level but be prepared to use nuclear
weapons when required. Military planning for US forces engaged
in WW will be based on a flexible and selective
capability including nuclear capability for use in
cases authorized by the President.

f. To meet non-nuclear attack with nuclear response
when vital US interests cannot be defended at the
non-nuclear level.

g. Be prepared to engage in the limited & selective
employment of nuclear weapons, as dictated, to
demonstrate US resolution.

h. Be able to shift on expanded area and/or scope of

(12) conflict in order that US & Allied strength may be
more effectively employed.

of deliberate attack
SU strategy becomes increasingly unlikely after 1962

9

Strat Con

a US military posture will be maintained which, in conjunction with other forces, will provide for the military supremacy of the Free World

and afford an adequate basis for essential operations to defeat communist forces at all levels of aggression.

The governing principles are:

a. US forces shall be employed & deployed to deter both CW & GW. (DCE)

b. While maintaining a strong overall deterrent, increased emphasis will be given the application of a wider range of military actions in order to achieve national objectives.

c. To insure the successful conclusion of any conflict or dispute in which the US may become involved by resolute action from the onset, and by coordinating any war in a manner designed to:

1) Defeat the enemy

2) Further the interests of US and its Allies

3) Provide a basis for the defeated opponents to become responsible members of the post-war

(4) Minimize damage consistent with the

interests of community

180 270 370

132 A world-wide, integrated and survivable
C&C system is urgently needed for conduct of
war which might involve selection and
execution of more than several attack options
based upon the assessment of such factors as:
type & nature of enemy attack; type & success
of U.S. response; status of remaining forces;
degree of damage sustained; etc. A centralized
display, on a global basis, to include pertinent
strategic warning, early warning, bomb alarm,
R&A and force status information data is
required to assist the decision making process
and conduct of the war.

telemetry system

42. Manned bombers: improve survivability,
penetrability, operational flexibility &
efficiency.

4. Strategic missiles: improve flexibility - rapid
reprogramming and retargeting capability,
variable trajectory and selective launch.

Flexibility is needed to necessary to
ensure adequate coverage of priority targets
[Minors, cross-targeting?] as well as possible
controllable response.

6. Around recon sub-int & destroy targets known or
suspected to exist but which cannot be located
with sufficient accuracy for economical
destruction (e.g. to avoid collateral damage) by
missile systems, for ^{very} land or mobile targets, for
assessment of bomb damage [around?] for intell.
collection & follow-on ops.

in order to provide within the military sphere, the essential foundation for true initiative in foreign affairs, the military must anticipate those force characteristics and capabilities which would contribute most effectively to a favorable military & psychological balance in the conflicts between Communism & the Free World.

The potential enemy must be confronted continually with new uncertainties in the military sphere which he is forced to consider & counter. [4445 2445?] The sum of these uncertainties must be such that he cannot hope to prevail at any given moment.

would weaken intra-European ties.

No doubt they would like veto on US move (now, US
is only individual nation with its own trigger; + UK, France)

But does NATO want that? Consider effect on EU
expectations; with new relations security, new threat
is better than simple on than NATO:-

Views of Amos, Ritz, Owen, Piers, Robins, McN, Gandy, Rogers,
Rostow, Nelson,

Annex K R+D

R+D planning must consider the military objectives
in plan and envisage the capabilities needed to
achieve a ^{winning} margin of superiority to
accomplish these objectives. The counterpart of this is
an essential element of R+C planning, but successful
R+D planning must look beyond the threat as
presently defined or forecast. The US national
military posture and associated R+D planning must
not be limited to reaction to the present or even
foreseeable evolution of potential threats. Strategic
planning — which is a reformer while the enemy has
already done, is currently doing, or may reasonably
be expected to do — is fundamentally inadequate
for success in the struggle for military superiority.

battles for intelligence superiority; counter
surveillance + target registration systems; a target
located may be one destroyed.

Feb 6 62